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BORDER SEARCH IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ--A BORDERLINE DECISION
The scope of the Fourth Amendment requirement of "probable
cause" for searches and seizures has precipitated considerable litigation
and voluminous law review commentary in the last decade. However,
the intricacies of the law of "border searches,"' not generally considered to be subject to probable cause requirements, 2 have received far

less attention.
The federal appellate courts have-in the absence of Supreme
Court or statutory direction--struggled to find an adequate means of

defining the concept of a "border search." All the circuits agree that
broad latitude must be given to immigrations and customs officials in
conducting their searches for smuggled goods or smuggled aliens. This
latitude has been characteristically justified by "the peculiar and diffi-

cult law enforcement problems that necessarily are presented by the effective policing of our extensive national boundaries." 4

In an early

1. 'Travellers may be . . . stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection. . . . But those lawfully within the country have
a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is . . . probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise."
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). A "border search" is a search
that is directly related to some crossing of the United States border. See generally
Comment, Border Searches: An Exception to Probable Cause, 3 ST. MARY's L.. 87
(1971); Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1006 (1968).
2. E.g., United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 462, 466 (9th Cir.
1971) (dissenting opinion) ('There is an exception to the probable cause requirement
[of the Fourth Amendment] applicable to 'border searches' of persons and vehicles.");
Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1967); see Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Of course, no statute could authorize a search which
the Constitution prohibited. E.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th
Cir. 1966) (en bane).
3. The Court has consistently denied certiorari in all cases challenging the constitutionality of the "border search." E.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964); Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d
106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 862 (1963); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d
389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); King v. United States, 258 F.2d
754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959); Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
4. King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1965); accord, United
States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968). Conceptually, the exception for a
"border search" is based upon "the inherent right of sovereignty to protect its terni1309
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case, Carroll v. United States,5 the Supreme Court laid down the rule
as to the authority of customs officials to conduct border searches:
[It is] lawful . . . to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person on which or whom . . . [custom officers] should suspect there was merchandise [entering the country unlawfully]. 6
Under the broad language of the Carroll decision, most investigations
undertaken by customs officials at or near the border have been sustained as valid by the courts.
Justification for the extensive investigatory powers exercised by
officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to enable them
to search for aliens illegally entering the country stems from a different
source-the so-called "stop and search" provisions of the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act. 7 As explained by an administrative
regulation,' these provisions permit officers to stop and search9 any
vehicle located within a reasonable distance'" of any external boundary of the country, and to do so without a warrant. The statute specifically avoids mention of the term "probable cause" as a basis for
the search, and instead employs the term "reasonable cause."1 1 Nevertorial integrity against intrusion of unauthorized persons or things." United States
v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1971); accord, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323
(9th Cir. 1970); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 285 (9th
Cir. 1963).
5. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
6. Id. at 151 (emphasis added). There was an early "border search" statute,
written at the time of the drafting of the Constitution. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5,
The present statutory guideline as to searches for
§ 23, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
smuggled goods is found at 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a), (c) (1970).
8. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (1971).

9. In the course of a "border search" for aliens, immigration officers have
been permitted to do the following: (1) interrogate the occupants of any vehicle
coming into the United States, (2) make any search pursuant to such investigations,
and (3) conduct prosecutions for violations of immigration laws based upon evidence
found as a result of such searches.

See Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011

(9th Cir. 1970); Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959); cf. Haerr v.
United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957); Flores v. United States, 234 F.2d 604

(5th Cir. 1956).
10. "Reasonable distance. The term 'reasonable distance' . . . means within 100
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)
air miles from any external boundary of the United States ......
(2) (1971). This distance was held to be constitutional, despite an attack claiming
that an extension of the authority for 100 miles was invalid per se. Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
"A degree of reasonable cause to search is
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1970).
required, though less than the tradition 'probable cause'." United States v. AlmeidaSanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion); United States v.
Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 832 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12

April 1972]

BORDER SEARCH

theless, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have held consistently
that searches conducted under the authority of the Immigration Act
must be undertaken only upon a showing of "probable cause" unless
such searches could independently qualify as "border searches."'"
These courts have reasoned that only border searches can be exempted
from the probable cause requirements. The Ninth Circuit, perhaps
alone among the Courts of Appeals,"3 has held to the contrary, 14 "expressly [refusing] to impose the probable cause restriction upon
searches for illegally entered aliens . . . whether or not the search in
question could qualify as a 'border search.'
This note will review the development of the Ninth Circuit's position on searches for contraband by customs officials, and for aliens by
immigration officials and will also discuss the reasoning of the court
for the explicit rejection of the view of border searches followed by
the other circuit courts. The note will focus on the recent case of
United States v. Almeida-Sanchez 6 as the latest expression from the
(2d Cir. 1968), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965); Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187,
189 (5th Cir. 1967).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. McGlove, 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968); Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900
(5th Cir. 1968).
13. One possible exception is the Tenth Circuit. See Roa-Rodriguez v. United
States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969).
14. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Matin, 444 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1971); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1970); Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Miranda,
426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970); Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F.2d 1170
(9th Cir. 1970); Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967);
Renteria-Medina v. United States, 346 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1965). See Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d
63 (9th Cir. 1961). While the earlier cases such as Fernandez and Contreras
may appear to demand probable cause for a warrantless search, the court in Fumagalli indicated otherwise. The earlier decisions, said the Ninth Circuit, explicitly
approve of the stopping and inspection of vehicles for concealed aliens without any
requirement of probable cause. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 464
n. 8 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), quoting Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d
1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally Note, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by Custom Officials, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 871 (1968).
15. 452 F.2d at 464 (dissenting opinion). "What all of these cases make
clear is that probable cause is not required for an immigration search within
[100 miles from a boundary] but is generally required to sustain the legality of a
search for contraband in a person's automobile conducted away from the international borders." 429 F.2d at 1013.
16. 452 F.2d at 459.
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Ninth Circuit on the law of "border search," and as an indication of
the court's future thinking in this area.

The Fourth Amendment: Probable Cause for Searches
The Fourth Amendment17 to the United States Constitution was
intended to operate as a safeguard of the people's fundamental right
of privacy. 1 8 As a result of its strictures, authorities may not normally
search any person or property without a showing of probable cause, or
without first obtaining a search warrant.' 9 Further, even though a
warrant may be issued by a magistrate or judicial officer, such issuance
20
must be predicated "upon at least a showing of probable cause.
Where time and circumstances-such as a suspect's likely escape from
the area-make the requirement of obtaining a search warrant impractical, the courts have consistently permitted law enforcement offi-

cials to conduct a search without warrant only if probable cause for
arrest exists.21 In the ordinary situation, law enforcement officers have
not been authorized to search without at least a showing of probable
cause; that is, in the case of the ordinary search which does not involve
border crossings, not even limitations of time will permit waiver of the
requirement of showing probable cause.22
17. "No warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
Affirmation.
...U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477
(8th Cir. 1942); Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1942); United
States v. St. Clair, 240 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Nelson v. United
States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1953); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13
(D.C. Cir. 1949), alr'd, 339 U.S 1 (1950).
20. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961); accord,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458 (1971); United States ex rel. DiRienzo
v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228, 230 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Long, 439 F.2d 628,
629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
21. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
United States v. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969); Klingler v. United States,
409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); United States v. King,
305 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Miss. 1969); see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 309 (1969);
United States v. Brown, 300 F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.H. 1969); McCoy v. Cupp, 298
F. Supp. 329 (D. Ore. 1969); Acosta v. Beto, 297 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
alf'd, 425 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1970).
22. It has been stated that the requirement of probable cause in a search
without warrant is no less stringent than that necessary to support issuance of a search
warrant. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 101 (4th Cir. 1962).
Peisner
demonstrated that the probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant is
the same as that required for a search without warrant. The court indicated that
the defendant's guilt was obvious, yet the conviction for transporting obscene ma-
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In attempting to formulate a workable definition of the term
"probable cause," the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. New
York 23 remarked as follows:
Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the
facts and circumstances. . are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 2caution
to believe that an offense has
4
been or is being committed.
Although the language in Berger appears to be rather imprecise, it has
often been repeated as the test for determining the validity of a search.
The lack of a more precise test perhaps stems from the imprecision in25
volved in the very concept of a cause based upon mere probability.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has explained, the judiciary often
must deal with issues of probability rather than absolutes; and these
items of probability are nothing less than "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act." 26
The Ninth Circuit's Effort to Define a "Border Search"
Although there seems little dispute among the courts that "border
searches" are different from searches generally, 7 considerable disagreement exists as to the exact definition of a "border search." Searches
conducted at the national boundaries clearly fall within the scope of
the term, and these searches present no special difficulties for the
courts. However, "border searches" which may be made at some distance from the border have been a source of conflict among the various circuits. The unsettled condition of the law regarding the definition of "border searches" as differentiated from the closely related
"stop and search" provisions of the Immigration Act 28 has been eviterials could not stand. The principal reason for such a result was that the arresting
officers lacked probable cause to search defendant's vehicle. Id. at 105-06. Recognizing the fact that probable cause must coexist with "extraordinary circumstances"
before a search without warrant may be effected, the court in Peisner remarked:
"A factual base offered to justify a search without a warrant must be sufficiently
strong to support the issuance of a search warrant." Id. at 105.
23. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24. Id. at 55 (emphasis added); accord, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). See, e.g., United States v. Thacker, 382 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1967) (information from a tipster); United States v. Bostic, 251 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Penn. 1966)
(words of another officer); United States v. Haskins, 213 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) (hearsay evidence).
25. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
26. Id., quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
27. "Searches of persons entering the United States from a foreign country are
in a separate category from searches generally." King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754,
756 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959), citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623, 624 (1886).
28. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a), (c) (1970), discussed in text accompanying notes
7-14 supra.
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denced most notably in the Ninth Circuit. 29 Although the standards
for determining what constitutes a valid "border search" have never
been clearly enunciated by the Ninth Circuit, the decisions rendered
from 1959 to 1971 have revealed no fewer than three distinct tests
for determining the validity of a search based upon the "border search"
concept. What this means, of course, is that the court-interpreting
on its own the scope of the broad term "border search"-first ascertains if the search in question could fit into this nebulous category;
if so, only "reasonable grounds" will justify the search. 30 If the search
does not fit into the "border search" category, it clearly is held to be
subject to the rules regarding probable cause."
The Completed Entry Test
Initially the Ninth Circuit required that probable cause be shown
for all searches other than those conducted immediately at the border,
unless the suspect was under hot pursuit from the border by customs
or immigration officers. In the 1959 decision of Cervantes v. United
States,32 the court began to deviate from the "at the border" standard
for assessing the validity of a search related to a border crossing.
In Cervantes defendant's vehicle was stopped3 3 at San Clemente,
California by a patrol inspector of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service who functioned also as an authorized customs inspector. The
officer did not have a warrant either for defendant's arrest or for the
search. Nevertheless, an investigation of the automobile was undertaken and certain contraband-narcotics and a hypodermic syringe29. Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970); Fumagalli v.
United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d
283 (9th Cir. 1970). These cases add to the confusion of determining what constitutes a valid "border search" by drawing a distinction between searches for aliens
and searches for contraband.
30. See note 1 supra.
31. "We reach our ultimate conclusion [conviction reversed] in this case with
great reluctance. The guilt of the defendant is plain.
"However judgments of conviction based on evidence [obtained in a search without probable cause] must be set aside." United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 106
(4th Cir. 1962). Where a search does not qualify as a "border search," evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause is inadmissible. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). A conviction based upon
such evidence cannot stand. Id. This exclusion rule applies to state as well as to
federal courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
One of the most intriguing problems presented by "border searches" is whether
evidence obtained in a foreign country may sustain a criminal prosecution in the
United States. See generally Note, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by
Custom Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 886 (1968).
32. 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959).
33. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
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Defendant was convicted of illegally importing, trans-

was discovered.

porting and concealing narcotics. The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court should not have admitted the
contraband into evidence, because it had been obtained in an illegal
search and seizure.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on the basis that there
had been no probable cause for the search and seizure and that the
officers had acted on mere suspicion.34 Of significance, however, was
the court's explanation as to the factors which prevented the investiga-

tion from qualifying as a "border search," which presumably would
have justified the otherwise illegal search and seizure. Essentially, the

court suggested that an investigation would qualify as a "border
search" if the suspect had not yet "completed entry" into the United
States, so as to have begun ordinary travel on its highways. The reason
the search in Cervantes did not qualify as a "border search" was that
"entry had been completed prior to the time [the defendant] reached

San Clemente."

5

The problems encountered by the court's attempts to implement
the "completed entry" test were enormous.3 6 The court was compelled to examine each entry on a case by case basis for completeness
both in terms of distance 3 7 and time.38 For example, as a traveler
moves from Mexico into the United States, he approaches the border,
34. 263 F.2d at 802. Prior to Cervantes, cases had held that a "border search"
was valid even if based on "mere suspicion".
35. Id. at 803 n.10. In Cervantes, the court took judicial notice of the fact
that San Clemente, the point of interrogation and arrest, was more than seventy miles
from the Mexican-American border.
36. In employing such a "completed entry" test, the exact delimitations of
how far the border itself extends presents a problem. The Fifth Circuit has said of
this problem: "The right of border search is indeed broad, and the border itself is
elastic." Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965), quoted in
King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1965).
37. E.g., Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Contreras, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961), where the court found no border
search because the distance involved (72 miles) was too great and entry was found, on
that basis, to have been complete.
38. E.g., Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961). In Plazola
a search for contraband was conducted after defendant had been across the border for
two hours. Id. at 59. The court reversed a conviction for importing and concealing
marijuana. "[T]his was not a 'border search' there was no evidence . . .sufficient to
justify [a] good faith belief that appellant was then violating the narcotics laws, or
had violated them that day in crossing the border." Id. at 61, citing Cervantes v.
United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959). See Taylor v. United States, 352 F.2d
328 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court did not mention how long it had been since the
defendant in that case had crossed the border; however, in deciding United States v.
Terry, 446 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit indicated that the time involved in Taylor had been about one hour. Id. at 581-82.
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then is at the border, then crosses and moves away from the border
on the United States side, both in time and distance. Two variablestime and distance-were used by the court under the "completed entry" test to determine when there had been a completed entry. Under
this test, of course, the defendant argued that his entry had been fully
achieved once he passed the inspection points along the national
boundaries and the court upheld only those searches which had been
conducted at or within extreme proximity to the border lines.
The Second Test: Is the Search Equivalent
to a Search at the "Time of Entry"?
In a series of decisions rendered during the early 1960's, the
"completed entry" test was gradually and subtly replaced as the Ninth
Circuit's standard of border searches by a less stringent guidelinethe "time of entry" test. In the first of these cases, Jones v. United
States,3" the defendant had been convicted for possession of marijuana.
The defendant's defense, which had been rejected by the trial court but
which was pursued on appeal, was that the physical evidence which
had been utilized at trial, the marijuana, had been obtained in an illegal search and seizure. The actual search of the defendant had, in
fact, taken place after he had crossed the border. The defendant had
been within the United States for at least two and one-half hours and
had traveled some sixty-seven miles from the border. The defendant
had not been the subject of a random or speculative investigation, however, because he had long been suspected of smuggling narcotics and
had been observed by customs officers at the border checkpoint, even
though he was not stopped there. After the defendant had left the
border, the officers had radioed seventy miles ahead to the Oceanside
checkpoint, and it was near this checkpoint that the defendant had been
40
stopped and the search and seizure effected.
Both the distance and time which had elapsed after the defendant
entered the country would clearly have exceeded the latitude allowed
under the "completed entry" test for "border searches.""1 Indeed, the
majority of the court in Jones, in affirming defendant's conviction, did
not rely on the fact that the case might have involved a "border
search." Rather, the majority premised the validity of the stop on the
fact that it was merely a routine check for aliens authorized by the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 42 The ensuing search was sustained
on the basis that there was probable cause after "suspicious parcels"
were seen in the defendant's trunk. The court held that the officers
39.
40.
41.
42.

326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 131.
See notes 37-38 & accompanying text supra.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a),(e) (1970). See text accompanying notes 97-109 infra.
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making the search had initially opened the trunk looking for illegal
aliens but, upon finding the parcels, were allowed to continue the search
-for contraband-because of the probable cause supplied by the parcels. However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Duniway discussed the
"border search" cases in some perspective and from his reasoning
evolved the eventual, expansive Ninth Circuit view regarding "border
searches":
[There is a separate ground upon which the judgment should
Those [earlier] cases did not involve a border
be affirmed. . .
search. This case does ....
One therefore need not decide whether when the trunk of
the car was opened and the officers saw a parcel of marijuana
. . . , they then had probable cause to require that the parcel be
opened. They would have had the right, without probable cause,
to require that it be opened if they had discovered it at the border.
They 43
had the same right. . . when they discovered it at the checkpoint.
Duniway's opinion thus was based on the premise that a search
away from the border is essentially the same as a search at the border
as long as the defendant is pursued from the border to the point of the
search-thus equating the search removed from the border to a search
at the border itself. The radioed message to the Oceanside checkpoint
constituted what might be termed a "constructive pursuit" which in effect extended the right of "border search" some sixty-seven miles. 44 Because the search in Jones met all the other attributes of a search valid
at the "time of entry," Dumiway construed it as a "border search."
The reasoning of Judge Duniway's concurring opinion in Jones
was adopted as the prevailing view of the Ninth Circuit two years later
in King v. United States." In King the search was conducted eight
43. 326 F.2d at 130-32 (emphasis added). Judge Duniway reasoned that the
radio communication to search defendant was the equivalent of fresh pursuit on the
part of an arresting or investigatory officer. Id. at 131.
44. Judge Duniway's analysis in Jones seems rather superficial. For example, he
stated in his opinion that "[tlhe use of the radio to alert the checkpoints amounts, in
substance and I think in law, to the same thing." Id. While this statement may
properly apply to the issue of pursuit, it does not seem to cover adequately the issue
of surveillance. For a search away from the border to be equivalent to a search at

the border, it would seem that the surveillance would have to be continuous.

This

would insure that whatever may be found away from the border was there at the time

of the border crossing and was not added en route.

Nevertheless, several cases de-

cided subsequent to Jones have held that a briak in the surveillance of a suspect is not
of itself enough to prevent a search removed from the border from being treated as a

search at the border.

E.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th

Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.

977 (1966).
45. 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965).
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miles from the Mexican-American border. Defendant had been followed and kept under uninterrupted surveillance by customs officers
from the time of his border crossing until he was ultimately stopped
and searched, and the contraband discovered and seized. The confiscated items were used as evidence, and the defendant was convicted by
the trial court of two smuggling offenses.4" On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court concluded that whatever was in the vehicle at the
47
time of the search must have been in the vehicle at the "time of entry,"
and the search was thus upheld as a valid "border search," and the trial
court decision was affirmed.
The court in King added only a minor caveat to the validation
of any search involving uninterrupted surveillance by customs personnel-the search would have to be undertaken at a time and distance
from the border deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances.
This limitation was deemed necessary by the court in order to insure
that there had been "no change in condition of such person or vehicle"48 from the time of the border crossing until the search.
The holding in King, which allowed the search to be considered
a "border search" because of the continuous surveillance, was expanded
by the same court a year later in Alexander v. United States 9 which
held the search to be a valid "border search" even though the surveillance had been interrupted. In Alexander there was uncontroverted
testimony that the customs officers had lost sight of the defendant's vehicle for a few minutes. Conceivably, the condition of the car or of the
defendant himself could have been altered in those few minutes. Nevertheless, the court found that the facts were sufficient "to convince
the fact finder.

.

.

that any contraband.

.

found in or on the vehicle

at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry
"50

In Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States,5' a 1967 decision, the
"time of entry" test reached its maximum expansion from the court.
46. Defendant was charged on two counts: (1) smuggling approximately 500,000
amphetamine tablets which should have been invoiced, and (2) knowingly receiving
and concealing narcotics in violation of 18 United States Code section 545. Defendant was convicted on both counts in the federal district court, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed as to each charge. Id. at 815.
47. Id. at 816.

48. Id.
49. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966).
50. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
The court made certain that Alexander
would not be viewed as aberrational, and that the standard it enunciated was intended
to have broad application. "Any search by Customs officials which meets this test is
properly called a 'border search.'" Id., quoted with approval in Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 15 (9th Cir. 1966).
51. 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
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In Rodriguez the customs officials at the Mexican-American border

were notified by an informant that a car would be crossing into the
United States carrying marijuana. On June 11, 1965, customs officers
observed the described car crossing the border with a male driver and a
female passenger. The officers followed the car to a public parking
lot in San Diego, at which point both occupants got out and disappeared. The following day, June 12, 1965, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant approached the car, peered inside, and departed. The defendant later returned, entered the automobile and began to drive it
on a freeway headed in the direction of Los Angeles. When he was
stopped, several miles from the parking lot, a search conducted by the
customs officers uncovered marijuana in the door panels of the car,
and the defendant was arrested, tried52and convicted for illegal concealment and transportation of marijuana.
The trial court allowed the marijuana to be introduced into evidence on the grounds that there was probable cause for a search.5"
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court, utilizing language quite similar to that of Judge Duniway in the Jones case, endorsed fully the
validity of the search and seizure under a broad definition of border
searches: "We do not reach [the probable cause] issue but affirm '54on
the alternative ground that the search was a valid 'border search'.

This decision thus cemented the Ninth Circuit's position on the
"time of entry" test.55 That is, the search was likened to one that
would, or could have been conducted at the border checkpoint, and
the fact that there had been a lapse of some fifteen hours since the
border crossing did not alter the character of the search.5" The court
found justification for its analogy to a search at the national boundary
in enumerated the following factors: (1) no intervention in the plan
by authorities until defendant was stopped; (2) the continuity of surveillance for the entire fifteen hour period; and (3) the intent to smug52. For a more detailed account of the events leading up to appellant's arrest see
Brief for the Appellant at 19-21, Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256
(9th Cir. 1967).
53. 378 F.2d at 257.
54. Id. at 257.
55. The court said that an investigation constituted a valid "border search"
when "[The facts] are such as to convince the fact finder . . . that any contraband
which might be found in or on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle
at the time of entry. . . . Any search by Customs officials which meets this test
is properly called a 'border search'." Id. at 258, quoting Alexander v. United States,
362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966) (emphasis added).
Other circuits had adopted a form of the "time of entry" test by the time that
Rodriguez-Gonzalez was decided. See Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 325
(5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Rodriguez, 292 F.2d 709, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1961);
Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1959).
56. 378 F.2d at 258.
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gle evidenced by the location of the contraband in a removable door
panel.17 The fact that defendant himself did not cross the border with
the vehicle was deemed to be of no consequence because "the primordial purpose of a search by customs officers is not to apprehend persons,
but to seize contraband ...
"58
The Third Test: "Recently Smuggled"
The most recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit appear to exhibit
a further shift of emphasis even from the broad "time of entry" standard. The major concern in determining whether the search qualifies
as a "border search" no longer seems to be one of determining whether
the contents of a searched vehicle were present at the "time of entry."
Instead the focus of the court has been to determine whether, as a
reasonable certainty, the vehicle contained "recently smuggled" goods
or persons. 59
United States v. Weill" was the point of departure by the Ninth
Circuit for the "recently smuggled" test. In Weil defendant's accomplice drove across the border into the United States. The car was
searched at the boundary, but no contraband was found.6' A few
hours later, the car was again seen in the area, but this time there were
two persons in the car-there was no indication that the second person,
the defendant, had ever crossed the border.
The investigating officer who had conducted the search testified
that the vehicle had been stopped because he "felt that [defendant and
his accomplice] had picked up something . . .,,"2 Upon a thorough
search of the trunk, the officer found marijuana hidden under false
bottoms in two suitcases. 63 Defendant challenged his conviction for
smuggling marijuana on the ground that the search had been illegal,
i.e., conducted without probable cause. The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the historical development of the "border search" concept6" and
then proceeded to add a new dimension to that concept. The court
57. Id.
58. Id., quoting Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966).
59. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1971).
Compare Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967) and
Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) and Blefare v. United States,
362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) and Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966) with United States v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119
(9th Cir. 1971) and United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970).
60. 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970).
61. Id. at 1321.
62. Id. at 1322.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1322-23. In so doing, the court acknowledged that the "time of entry" test had been the prevailing standard up to that time.
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remarked that the present case was distinguishable on its facts from
the earlier Rodriguez-Gonzales and Alexander decisions because an
actual search of the vehicle had been previously conducted at the border by customs officers. The search had disclosed no contraband
present at the time of entry, and no surveillance of the automobile had
been undertaken or maintained after the border crossing and until the
subsequent stop of the vehicle. By contrast, the prior decisons had
involved only an initial search, even though conducted away from the
border, and the defendant had been kept under continuous close surveillance, which allowed the court to find constructive equivalence of
the actual search to one that would have taken place at the "time of
entry."65 At this point in the discussion, had the court applied the
"time of entry" standard, it seems clear that the second search in Well
would have been held invalid, and the court would not have upheld
introduction of evidence as to the contraband. 66 However, the Ninth
Circuit broke away from the "time of entry" standard and stated that
such a standard could no longer be maintained as "the sine qua non of
a 'border search'.1 67 Rather a new test was to be used, which the
court justified in the following manner:
It seems obvious to us that the right of customs agents to search
a vehicle without probable cause is not confined to vehicles that
have crossed the border. . . . We also think that, if customs
agents are reasonably certain that parcels have been (a) smuggled
across the border and (b) placed in a vehicle, whether the vehicle itself has crossed the border or not, they may stop and
search the vehicle. 68
This holding by the Ninth Circuit completely supersceded the
"time of entry" rationale.6 9 Prior cases, in which the court had applied the "time of entry" test to validate the search, had involved surveillance or pursuit of some sort,7 and the surveillance factor was the
device relied on by the court to link the search removed from the border to the border itself. Under the "recently smuggled" test enunci65. See text at notes 45-58 supra.
66. "It did not occur at the border, and the car had already been searched there.
Moreover, when the car crossed the border, it contained no contraband. We assume
that it was because of these facts that the trial court held that the search was not a
border search ....
[Tlhe language of some of our decisions supports this result."
432 F.2d at 1322.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
69. "Here, while there was not a completed surveillance, and while Weil was
not seen crossing the border ... [it was] reasonably certain that that is what he did."
Id. at 1323 (emphasis added). The court in Weil also made a thorough discussion
of border searches. Id. at 1322-23.
70. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 977 (1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965); Jones
v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1963).
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ated in Weil, the court expressly refutes the necessity of surveillance to
validate the search as a "border search," and even
goes so far as to
71
disclaim the need to show an actual border crossing.
The effect of Weil has been to broaden greatly the scope of "border searches."'7 2 All that is required to constitute a "border search"
under the "recently smuggled" test is that there exist some reasonable
certainty of past smuggling. While the majority of the court in a recent case, United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,73 did not discuss this
point, the dissenting opinion reasoned that the entire "border
search"
74
policy had by now been extended too far by the Ninth Circuit.
Aliens v. Merchandise
In addition to having perhaps the broadest test for "border
searches" in all the federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit has recently begun to draw a marked distinction in the requirements for
searches conducted for "aliens," as opposed to those for "merchandise."
This distinction, though questioned by some jurists,7 5 appears to be
premised on the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the "stop and
search" provisions in the Immigration Act.7" These provisions were
77
originally enacted to deal exclusively with the illegal alien problem.
The earlier decisions of the Ninth Circuit, like those in other jurisdictions, recognized no distinctions in the nature of an investigation to
discover illegal aliens and one for intercepting smuggled goods. For
example, in both Contreras v. United States7 8 and Valenzuela v. United
States79 searches had been conducted for aliens by officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In both cases, while there was no
71. See note 69 supra.
72. The court in Weil stressed, however, the uniqueness of the factual situation before it. 432 F.2d at 1323.
73. 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
75. As the dissenting opinion in Almeida-Sanchez points out, the distinction
between a search for aliens and a search for contraband has never been justified by any

court: "If a reason exists for distinguishing searches for aliens from searches for merchandise, no one-including this court-has yet suggested what it might be. Nothing
in the words of the Constitution supports it. And no one suggests that the public

interest in excluding admissible aliens is greater than that in excluding narcotics and
other contraband." Id. at 464.
76. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1) (1970).
See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1952), where it was stated that "the right to exclude or to expel all aliens or

any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, is an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential tc

its safety, its independence, and its welfare. ....
"
77.

Id.

78.

291 F.2d 63 (9thCir. 1961).

79.

425 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1970).
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discovery of illegally entered aliens, contraband was discovered in the
investigated vehicle and utilized as evidence in the subsequent convictions of the defendant. The Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions for
smuggling of contraband in each case on the basis that the government
had failed to demonstrate probable cause for the search and seizure.
The court also stated in both cases that no showing had been made that
the investigations had qualified as "border searches." In essence, the
court treated the cases as ordinary searches for contraband under probable cause standards, even though the searches had been initiated to
detect illegal aliens. Recently the court has changed its policy regarding
such searches.
In 1970 the Ninth Circuit heard a series of three cases8" in which
the factual situations were quite similar to Contrerasand Valenzuelasearch conducted by immigration officers looking for illegal aliens and
contraband discovered instead. In each of these decisions the court upheld a conviction for violation of the narcotics law, and in each the
affirmance was centered on a newly found distinction between a search
conducted for aliens and one conducted for contraband.
In United States v. Miranda,81 the earliest of the three cases, the
defendant had been stopped some sixty or seventy miles north of the
Mexican-American border by immigration officers conducting a routine
check for aliens staying illegally in the country. The immigration officer conducting the search looked under the hood of defendant's carostensibly looking for aliens.12 The officer found no aliens, but did
discover twenty-four bricks of marijuana, and the defendant was subsequently convicted by the trial court for smuggling marijuana into the
the Ninth Circuit relied squarely on the
United States. In affirming,
"stop and search" statute8 3 and its interpretative regulation, 4 and
stated:
[A] properly authorized officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . is empowered, without a warrant, to board
and search any vehicle for aliens "within. .. 100 miles from any
external boundary of the United States ....
The court in Miranda did not even discuss probable cause requirements as a basis for the search, nor did the court mention the "border
80. Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1970).
81. 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970).
82. The officer testified that although there was not enough room for an alien to
hide under the hood of the particular car, aliens had been known to hide in such
locations. Id. at 284.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
84. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1971).
85. 426 F.2d at 284.
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search" exception to the probable cause requirement for an investigation. Instead, the court held that searches for aliens, like "border
searches," were beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause, and that contraband discovered in the course
of such a search was perfectly admissible into evidence.
Any doubts as to the extent of allowable searches by immigration
officers were thoroughly dispelled in Fumagalli v. United States.8 6 In
Fumagallithe defendant had been stopped by immigration officers conducting a routine search for illegal aliens forty-nine miles north of the
Mexican border. The defendant had been asked to open the trunk of
his car, in which the officers had discovered a brick of marijuana. The
defendant was subsequently convicted for smuggling marijuana into
the United States. On appeal from the conviction, the defendant contended that the contraband had been seized during an unlawful search,
because the search had been conducted without probable cause and
without a warrant. 87 The court, however, disagreed with the defendant's contentions and held as follows:
[P]robable cause is not required for an immigrationsearch . . . but
is generally required to sustain the legality of a search for contraband [unless it is a "border search"].
Applying these distinct tests to the instant case. . . the opening of the trunk was proper as part of a routine investigation for
"illegal aliens" . . ..
8
In Duprez v. United States89 the separate tests applied by the
Ninth Circuit for searches involving aliens as opposed to searches for
contraband reached its full measure. The factual situation in Duprez
was essentially the same as in Fumagalli and Miranda." In his appeal
from a conviction of concealing marijuana, the defendant argued that
the immigration checkpoint in question, which was approximately seventy miles from the border, did not come within the "unique 'border
search power' given to customs and immigration officers at the international border and within the immediate areas. "'
The court, however, rejected the defendant's argument on the basis that the government had not attempted to assert that the search in
question was a "border search."92 The court, by affirming the con86. 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. Id. at 1012.
88. Id. at 1013.
89. 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970).
90. The stop for the search in Duprez had been approximately eighty miles from
the Mexican-American border. There had been no surveillance nor pursuit until the
vehicle had traveled some "sixty-seven to seventy-seven" miles from the border. Id.
91. Id. at 1277.
92. Id.
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viction of the defendant in Duprez, removed any possible doubt as to
the scope of authority allowed immigration officers to conduct searches
in the Ninth Circuit-they are exempted from probable cause requirements and are entitled to stop and investigate any vehicle on mere
of whether such an investigation con"reasonable" grounds, regardless
93
stitutesa valid bordersearch.
In a recent decision, United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,94 the defendant had been convicted for knowingly receiving, concealing, and
facilitating the transportation of approximately 161 pounds of illegally
imported marijuana. 95 His sole contention on appeal was that the trial
court had erroneously denied a motion to suppress the evidence which
had been found in a search of his automobile by agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. As in Duprez, the agents had conducted the search as part of a roving check for aliens.90
In a per curiam opinion, the majority opinion cited the peculiar
Ninth Circuit law as to searches for aliens by immigration officers:
A stop and search [for aliens] effected under 8 U.S.C. § 1357
the "stop and search" statute is not a "border search" and does
not depend for its validity upon the law of border searches.91
The court concluded that because the investigation had been confined
to the rear seat, a location suspected by the officers as concealing the
illegal aliens, the search was deemed "reasonable" in scope, and the
contraband discovered in the search was thus admissible as evidence. 98
In a dissenting opinion in Almeida-Sanchez, Judge Browning
raised considerable question as to the correctness of search and seizure
law in the Ninth Circuit. Judge Browning felt strongly that the entire
trend with regard both to "border searches" and "searches by immigration officers" had been extended to unjustified proportions, and in
his opinion stressed the need for the Ninth Circuit to more closely
conform to doctrines expressed by the other courts of appeals.
Judge Browning reasoned that there were really only two categories of searches acceptable under constitutional strictures: (1) ordinary searches under probable cause requirements, and (2) "border
searches" which were judicially and statutorily viewed as an exception
93. 'The primary function of a checkpoint is investigating and apprehending
aliens who may have entered the United States illegally. The right to do so is provided for in Title 8, U.S.C. § 1357. This court has repeatedly approved the right to
stop and investigate vehicles for concealed aliens without a showing of probable cause."
Id.
94. 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1970), the federal statute under which these acts
were proscribed.
96. 452 F.2d at 460.
97. Id. at 461.
98. Id.
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to the probable cause requirement. 99 In distinguishing between
searches for aliens and searches for contraband, the Ninth Circuit had
effectively created a third category of permissible searches without
probable cause requirements, and this, the judge felt, was clearly improper.
In his dissent, Judge Browning questioned the majority's interpretation of the "stop and search" statute on a broader ground as well.
Judge Browning remarked that it was reasonable to assume that the
authority granted Immigration and Naturalization Service agents looking for illegal aliens was the same, and subject to the same constitutional limitations, as the power given customs personnel looking for
contraband. 10 ° The legislative history of the Immigration Act was
cited in support of this view,' and Judge Browning concluded that
investigations directed at the detection of illegally entered aliens should
require probable cause, unless they meet the "border search" specifications:
It is axiomatic that a statute is to be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional standards. The statute authorizing customs officers to search persons and vehicles for smuggled goods,
taken literally, would authorize search of any person or vehicle
at any time or place on no more than subjective suspicion. But
. . . this court and others have held that a showing of probable
cause is required for all Customs searches except those qualifying
as border searches.
The statutory provision authorizing Immigration officers to
construed to comport with
search for aliens should be similarly
02
Fourth Amendment limitations .1
Perhaps the most reasonable interpretation of the "stop and
search" statute is not that it defines a standard of reasonable conduct
for immigration officers, but rather that it grants authority to such officers to be exercised only within constitutional limitations. Thus a
search conducted within the bounds set forth by the statute would not
be illegal because it was beyond the officers' granted authority. How99. See authorities cited at note 2 supra.
100. 452 F.2d at 465; cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925):
"Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in."
101. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
102. 452 F.2d at 465-66. But see Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162, 164
(5th Cir. 1952): "Obviously there is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to
an Act of Congress, especially when the act turns on what is reasonable, and the
courts should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was
unreasonable and that the Act was in consequence unconstitutional."
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ever, such a search, though within the officers' authority, would be illegal if it nonetheless violated the Fourth Amendment. 108
As the dissenting opinion in Almeida-Sanchez points out, other
sections of the same "stop and search" statute have been held to imply
limitations consistent with the Constitution. 10 4 For example, the statutory provisions'0 5 which authorize immigration officers to stop and
interrogate aliens as to their right to be in the United States has been
held to be limited by considerations relative to interrogations generally.10 6 The Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause has
also been read into the statutory provisions' 0" which authorize immigration officers to arrest aliens. 08 The exemption from constitutional
probable cause requirements inherent in the interpretation by the Ninth
Circuit of the statutory provisions'0 9 authorizing immigration officers
to search for illegal aliens appears to be highly questionable, if not unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The law of "border searches" is still unsettled in the Ninth Circuit. This forum has, in the past, moved from the "completed entry"
test to the "time of entry" test and finally to the "recently smuggled"
test. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has differentiated searches by immigration officers, in which contraband is discovered, from searches for
contrabandby customs officers. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit stands
alone among the courts of appeals. The Ninth Circuit presently recognizes the broad "recently smuggled" test as the measure of a valid
"border search" for contraband,and sanctions, as illustrated in the Almeida-Sanchez case, any search for aliens which results in discovery
of contraband, if conducted by an authorized immigration officer
within a reasonable distance (100 miles) of the border. Thus, in the
Ninth Circuit, the authority granted customs and immigration agents
appears to have reached its maximum extension. The cases in the
103. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
104. 452 F.2d 459, 466 (9th Cir. 1971).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970).
106. Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d
217, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1971): "[Slince aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth
Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate
must be controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made
by other law enforcement officials." See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
where the Supreme Court clarifies the general constitutional mandates involved in a
"stop and frisk" situation.
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970).
108. Yam Sang Kwai v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
411 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
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other circuits have been reluctant to go as far. Perhaps, as recommended by the dissent in Almeida-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit would
do well to reconsider its present position.
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